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In the realm of monetary policy, 1994
was an eventful year. In February, the
central bank's Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) engineered the first
of what would eventually number six
increases in the closely watched federal
funds rate — the interest rate that banks
charge each other for overnight loans.
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In contrast to 1993, a year characterized
by remarkable stability in short-term
interest rates, these actions culminated in
federal funds rates that, by year-end,
matched levels not seen since 1989.
What should be made of this experi-
ence? The professional punditry speaks
clearly on this subject: Economic activ-
ity in 1994, as measured by the annual
growth rate of real GDP, attained a level
not enjoyed in this country since the
Reagan era. In the minds of the inflation-
fearful Federal Reserve, such growth
must be restrained, lest price pressures
boil over. Hence, it is asserted, in 1994
the FOMC embarked on a campaign of
ever higher interest rates, and ever
"tighter" monetary policy, to slow the
pace of economic activity.
To most people, this is strange behavior
indeed. It seems to contradict the
publicly stated mission of the FOMC to
ensure "maximum sustainable growth
by pursuing and ultimately achieving a
stable price level."
2 How can the pur-
suit of price stability be inconsistent
with, and simultaneously promote, eco-
nomic growth?
My response stresses two essential
points: First, the level of interest rates is,
in general, a poor indicator of the stance
of monetary policy. Most, if not all, of
last year's rise in the federal funds rate
has been inappropriately characterized as
monetary tightening. Second, commen-
tary on recent FOMC actions fails to dis-
tinguish the relationship between infla-
tion and economic growth in the short
run from that which might exist in the
long run.
Although this second point has long been
fodder for debate among economists, its
import is far more than academic. The
widely held belief that the monetary
authority must fight economic growth in
order to combat inflation results directly
from the fact that the Federal Reserve
lacks a concrete long-run mandate to pro-
tect the purchasing power of money. In-
deed, I argue here that the absence of a
clear objective can force a monetary
authority to focus unduly on short-run
fluctuations in prices and output that are
unimportant in the long run and largely
uncontrollable in the short run. At best,
this orientation reduces clarity of purpose.
At worst, it fundamentally compromises
the ultimate mission of monetary policy.
• Interest Rates in 1994:
A Real Explanation
Why were interest rates higher at the be-
ginning of 1995 than they were at the
beginning of 1994? Connoisseurs of
conventional wisdom might recognize
this straightforward story: Interest rates
rose over the course of 1994 because
How should we consider the Federal
Reserve's policy moves in 1994 —as
strict monetary tightening to slow eco-
nomic growth, or as a series of defen-
sive moves to maintain the desired
rate of monetary growth in the face of
other rising market interest rates?
And what is the appropriate policy
focus for the central bank in 1995?
The author offers his perspective on
these questions and suggests formal
multiyear commitments to specific
inflation objectives as a way to both
enhance the Federal Reserve's credi-
bility and allow it to focus properly on
long-run objectives.
that's what the Fed wanted. Although
appealing in its simplicity, this claim
misconstrues the Fed's role in interest-
rate determination and ignores compel-
ling developments in the real economy
that offer a nonmonetary explanation for
the events of last year.
To make the argument concrete, think
first of a market for a familiar good, say
apples. Little confusion or controversy
surrounds the determination of prices in
this market—when the demand for
apples rises or the supply decreases, the
price of apples goes up.
Thinking in terms of simple supply and
demand is useful because an interest rate,
after all, is just a price. Specifically, mar-
ket interest rates represent the price thatborrowers pay, and lenders receive, for
loanable funds. Just as the price of apples
rises when the demand for apples in-
creases, interest rates tend to rise when
the demand for borrowing increases.
This scenario—a rising demand for
credit leading to higher interest rates—
provides a good description of the econ-
omy over the past two years. Near the
beginning of 1993, household saving
rates reversed a nearly three-year upward
trend. At the same time, consumer loans
issued by commercial banks began to
move sharply higher. By the end of the
year, the pace of economic activity had
accelerated, consumer borrowing de-
mand had continued to grow, and long-
term interest rates had begun to rise. A
shift in expectations toward higher sus-
tained GDP growth emerged, and the
dollar value of commercial and industrial
loans abruptly reversed its own three-
year skid and began to increase rapidly.
As 1994 unfolded, the growth rate of
output and incomes notched a level
higher, and loan demand continued to
build. As the economy finally emerged
from the shadow of the 1990-91 reces-
sion into a cyclical phase more typical of
an expansion, this increased demand for
resources led to continued upward pres-
sure on long-term interest rates. Begin-
ning in early 1994, short-term rates also
began to head higher. By the end of the
year, the rebound in market rates had
brought real, or inflation-adjusted, in-
terest rates to levels closer to those con-
sidered to be the long-run norm.
• Interest Rates and the FOMC
How does the preceding explanation of
market interest-rate movements relate to
the decisions of the FOMC, and in what
way are such considerations informative
about monetary policy?
Let's return to our apple-market meta-
phor. Suppose an entity known as the
Central Seed Authority (CSA) oversees
the functioning of the apple market by
regulating the supply of apple trees to
fruit suppliers. On any given day, the
CSA smooths temporary fluctuations in
the demand for apple trees by agreeing to
supply trees in such a way as to keep their
price constant (providing, in the jargon of
economists, a perfectly elastic supply of
apple trees in the short run). However,
this policy — which implies that demand
shifts will determine the quantity of apple
trees supplied by the CSA — applies only
to transitory market bumps that are ex-
pected to reverse course in relatively
short order. In the long run, the CSA de-
sires to neither increase nor decrease the
quantity of apple trees.
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What, then, if the market experiences a
permanent upswing in the demand for
apples? Clearly, apple prices will rise
and suppliers, sensing profit opportuni-
ties, will demand more apple trees. If the
CSA were to maintain its short-run pol-
icy of constant tree prices, it would have
to accommodate this extra demand com-
pletely and increase the quantity of trees.
But this is ultimately inconsistent with
the CS A's long-run policy of keeping the
tree supply constant. If the higher de-
mand for apples proves permanent, so
will fruit suppliers' demand for apple
trees. Thus, the tree price that is consis-
tent with the Authority's desired long-
run quantity of trees will be higher than
the price that prevailed before the
change in demand.
With a bit of simplification, the FOMC
is in a situation similar to our fictional
Central Seed Authority. The Fed sup-
plies money (bank reserves) to fuel bank
intermediation activities in the same way
the CSA supplies apple trees to fruit sell-
ers. Furthermore, in the short run,
reserves are supplied in such a way as to
keep the relevant price—the federal
funds rate—near a constant, predeter-
mined level.
When market loan demand expands, in-
terest rates rise and the demand for bank
reserves increases. Maintaining a con-
stant interbank lending rate, then, re-
quires that the Fed accommodate the
higher reserve demand. However, if this
pattern is sustained, it is likely to result in
a more rapid expansion of the money
supply than that consistent with central-
bank objectives. Thus, to maintain a neu-
tral policy stance, the federal funds rate
at which the FOMC is willing to supply
reserves must increase. Consequently, in
the long run, the price of reserves sup-
plied by the central bank will rise along
with market interest rates.
To assess the plausibility of this scenario
for 1994, recall that market interest rates
did in fact begin rising prior to any
FOMC move to implement higher inter-
bank lending rates: The yield on 10-year
government securities bottomed out in
October 1993, almost four months
before the change in the FOMC's target
federal funds rate (announced on Febru-
ary 4), and at a time when few market
participants expected any significant,
imminent change in policy.
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This is not to say that market interest
rates, especially short-term rates, are
completely unaffected by changes in the
interbank lending rate brought about by
FOMC policy. Nor are all monetary pol-
icy actions equivalent. However, careful
thought about the economic develop-
ments of the past several years, as well
as about the nature of monetary policy,
supports a key conclusion: Most, if not
all, of the six increases in the federal
funds rate associated with FOMC deci-
sions in 1994 are inappropriately charac-
terized as restrictive monetary policy
actions. On the contrary, they can be
thought of as defensive moves required
by the higher real rates associated with
growing confidence in the economy and
the resulting strength in private spend-
ing. The goal of such actions is not to
raise the level of market interest rates,
but to maintain the desired rate of mone-
tary growth in the face of rates that are
rising for reasons unrelated to FOMC
policy per se.
• Money and Prosperity
But why the emphasis on restraining the
growth rate of money? Doesn't the
availability of more money promote eco-
nomic growth and prosperity?
The answer must be no, and it is at this
point that my apple-market metaphor
begins to fail. Unlike apples, money is
not an intrinsically valuable good. In
other words, monetary assets in modern
industrial economies have value only to
the extent that they represent purchasing
power over the real goods and services
that households and businesses wish to
acquire. But the central bank directly
controls only the dollar, or nominal,
value of money. If the Federal Reserve
provides the banking sector with a
greater rate of reserves than is consistentwith the private sector's willingness to
hold monetary assets, the result will not
be more wealth, consumption, or invest-
ment, but a reduction in the purchasing
power of money.
• The Complex Relationship
between Inflation and Growth
The core responsibility of any nation's
monetary authority is to avoid the disrup-
tive influences of a fluctuating value of
money. In the United States, the rationale
for this responsibility is often expressed
as follows: To foster maximum sustain-
able economic growth, the Fed must pro-
vide an environment of low inflation. But
sometimes, this objective requires re-
straining economic growth. Thus, faster
growth requires low inflation, but low
inflation requires slower growth.
A bit confusing, isn't it? The key distinc-
tion that isn't being made clearly here—
or, for that matter, in many public discus-
sions of monetary policy—is between
the short run and the long run. Long-run
price stability fosters the conditions for
achieving maximum sustainable eco-
nomic growth. This widely accepted
assertion does not rule out a positive rela-
tionship between inflation and the pace
of economic activity in the short run.
Over the course of a typical business
cycle, it would not be unusual to witness
sympathetic movements in price-level
and output growth. That is, at some stage
in an expansion, prices may rise faster
than normal as demand growth outpaces
supply. Conversely, at some stage in an
economic slowdown, the price level may
fall or rise at a slower-than-normal rate
as demand growth weakens. On average,
however, changes that are faster than
normal will be offset by those slower
than normal. Thus, the short-run correla-
tion between inflation and GDP growth
is not informative about the long-run
impact of the average inflation rate on
output growth, standards of living, and
economic well-being.
It is exactly these long-run relationships
that should be the primary concern of the
Federal Reserve: Ultimately, it is how
policy decisions impact the price-level
trend, or average inflation rate, that af-
fects the functioning of the economy.
Consequently, the long-run path of
prices, and not short-run deviations from
the path, would seem to be the appropri-
ate focal point of monetary policy.
• The Credibility Factor
But if this contention is valid, why do
some members of the FOMC itself ap-
pear overly concerned about the price-
level consequences of capacity con-
straints, an "overheating" economy, and
"unsustainable" rates of output growth?
More important, why do they appear
ready to act on such concerns by risk-
ing, or even pursuing, actions that
would move monetary policy from neu-
tral to restrictive?
For some, the answer may be credibility.
If the FOMC operated under a clear, veri-
fiable, and single-minded objective for
maintaining long-run price stability—
and price stability alone—short-run fluc-
tuations in the rate of inflation would
matter little. To be sure, in any given year
the rate of inflation might be higher than
normal as a result of cyclical develop-
ments that are largely independent of the
long-run stance of monetary policy. But
such inflation effects would eventually
be offset by contrary developments at
other stages of the business cycle. Be-
cause these short-run fluctuations in the
price level net to zero over time, they
would have no real consequence for the
long-run purchasing power of money and
would also have minimal consequences
for the operation of monetary policy.
Unfortunately, many private-sector mar-
ket participants believe that the Federal
Reserve has not been given a clear man-
date to pursue policies that will deliver
long-run price stability. As a result, many
believe that Federal Reserve policymak-
ers must earn their inflation-fighting
bona fides by actively resisting all price-
level pressures—even those that would
not ultimately require monetary reactions
to preserve the purchasing power of
money. In other words, because the Fed
lacks a credible long-run price goal,
some policymakers may believe that they
should react quickly to inflation blips,
lest the public question their resolve to
contain inflation.
This unfortunate state of affairs not only
promotes the unproductive perception
that the Fed must fight growth to fight
inflation: It also promotes an environ-
ment in which monetary policy must take
a far more activist stance than is neces- •
sary, leading the public to mistakenly la-
bel price stability policies as anti-growth.
• A Proposed Framework
Most of the federal funds rate increases
engineered by the FOMC in 1994 were
defensive actions taken not to implement
restrictive policy, but to guard against an
overly accommodative policy. Nonethe-
less, monetary actions that result in high-
er federal funds rates must at some point
cease to be neutral. Just as clearly, the
level at which this occurs is a matter of
considerable ambiguity. When is enough
enough? More important, on which side
of neutral should the FOMC err? Does
the calculation change if (as most eco-
nomic forecasters expect) the U.S. infla-
tion rate accelerates in 1995 as a natural
by-product of cyclical developments?
That the economy would experience ris-
ing interest rates last year during such an
expansion phase of the business cycle
was a foregone conclusion, the federal
funds rate being no exception. But as the
economy continues to expand and as real
interest rates approach levels more con-
formable to historical norms, policy de-
cisions become more difficult. The cred-
ibility of the FOMC and private-sector
inflation expectations will inevitably
loom large in determining the appropri-
ate actions to be taken as 1995 unfolds.
The task ahead is complicated enor-
mously by the lack of an institutional
framework that clearly identifies price
stability as the sole long-run objective of
monetary policy. One sensible frame-
work that merits consideration is a for-
mal and public multiyear commitment
by the FOMC to specific inflation objec-
tives. This commitment need not include
a monthly or even yearly requirement
that these objectives be continuously
realized—thus leaving room for the pos-
sibility of cyclical fluctuations in the
growth rate of the price level. Nor would
it require changing the Fed's short-run
operational methods and objectives. But
it would impose a higher standard of
accountability for the economy's price
outcomes that are, in the long run, deter-
mined by the monetary authority.
5The complex issues of credibility and
public expectations cannot, of course, be
solved single-handedly with publicly an-
nounced objectives. Moreover, although
even formal multiyear price-level goals
may not resolve all of the ambiguities in
the current policy structure, they would
certainly offer some advantages. Ulti-
mately, convincing the public that mone-
tary policy actions are taken to promote
long-run sustainable growth will surely
require that the Federal Reserve be more
explicit about its long-run inflation ob-
jectives, and be held accountable for
pursuing policies consistent with achiev-
ing them.
• Footnotes
1. A seventh increase followed the FOMC
meeting of January 31-February 1, 1995.
2. Testimony of Federal Reserve Chairman
Alan Greenspan before the Subcommittee on
Economic Growth and Credit Formation of
the Committee on Banking, Finance, and
Urban Affairs of the U.S. House of Represen-
tatives, July 22, 1994.
3. Why would such a policy make sense?
This is a good question, and one I will, for the
most part, simply beg. However, consider the
following: Suppose apple demand is highly
seasonal, but that the private stock of apple
trees is relatively fixed. In the absence of the
CSA, seasonal fluctuations in demand could
cause fairly large seasonal swings in the price
of apples. If society deemed these transitory
price effects harmful, it could create the CSA
to provide an elastic supply of apple trees in
the short run, thereby decreasing or eliminat-
ing such effects.
In the long run, however, it may be clear
that a determinate number of apple trees is
best, perhaps due to concerns about soil con-
servation. Thus, although fluctuations in the
tree supply may be optimal in the short run,
the CSA would be charged with maintaining
a relatively fixed supply on average to ensure
that the long-run quantity of trees is consis-
tent with maximum sustainable production
in the apple market.
4. The consensus outlook according to the
October 1993 issue of Blue Chip Financial
Forecasts held that"... interest rates are
expected to drift sideways over the next six
months ... [and] Fed policy is expected to
remain on hold until the spring of next year."
Although 30-year yields had risen some 35
basis points from mid-October to mid-
November, the consensus in December held
that"... the Fed will hike its federal funds rate
target by 25 basis points in March or April...
No additional tightening of policy by the Fed
is expected until autumn. Short-term interest
rates are expected to rise by only 50 to 75
basis points over the course of the year...."
5. A specific example of how price-level ob-
jectives might work in an operational sense is
given in William T. Gavin and Alan C.
Stockman, "A Price Objective for Monetary
Policy," Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland,
Economic Commentary, April 1, 1992.
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